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Abstract
Modern applications on general purpose processors require both rapid and power-
efficient computing and memory components. As applications continue to improve,
the demand for high speed computation, fast-access memory, and a secure platform
increases. Traditional Von Neumann Architectures split the computing and memory
units, causing both latency and high power-consumption issues; henceforth, a hybrid
memory processing system is proposed, known as in-memory processing. In-memory
processing alleviates the delay of computation and minimizes power-consumption;
such improvements saw a 14x speedup improvement, 87% fewer power consumption,
and appropriate linear scalability versus performance. Several applications of in-
memory processing include data-driven applications such as Artificial Intelligence
(AI), Convolutional and Deep Neural Networks (CNNs/DNNs). However, processing-
in-memory can also suffer from a security and reliability issue known as the Row
Hammer Security Bug; this security exploit flips bits within memory without access,
leading to error injection, system crashes, privilege separation, and total hijack of a
system; the novel Row Hammer security bug can negatively impact the accuracies of
CNNs and DNNs via flipping the bits of stored weight values without direct access.
Weights of neural networks are stored in a variety of data patterns, resulting in either
a solid (all 1s or all 0s), checkered (alternating 1s and 0s in both rows and columns),
row-stripe (alternating 1s and 0s in rows), or column-striped (alternating 1s and 0s in
columns) manner; the row-stripe data pattern exhibits the largest likelihood of a Row
Hammer attack, resulting in the accuracies of neural networks dropping over 30%. A
row-stripe avoidance coding scheme is proposed to reduce the probability of the Row
Hammer Attack occurring within neural networks. The coding scheme encodes the
binary portion of a weight in a CNN or DNN to reduce the chance of row-stripe data
patterns, overall reducing the likelihood of a Row Hammer attack occurring while







Table of Contents v
List of Figures vii
List of Tables 1
1 Introduction 2
1.1 Processing-in-Memory (PIM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Row Hammering (RH) Security Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 The Effects of Row Hammer Attack on In-Memory Processing . . . . 10
2 Background 14
2.1 In-memory Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Row-Hammering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 Vulnerability Analysis of a Programmable In-memory Architecture 30
3.1 Programmable In-memory Processing core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Programmable In-memory Processing Cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 Programmable In-memory Processing Router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4 Programmable In-memory Processing Function Word Generation . . 34
3.5 In-memory Processing Multiply and Accumulate Operations . . . . . 34
3.6 In-memory Processing Activation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.7 Field Programmable Gate Array Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.7.1 Technology Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.7.2 Machine Learning Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.7.3 In-memory processing Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.7.4 Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.8 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
v
CONTENTS
3.8.1 pPIM characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.8.2 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.8.3 Vulnerability Analysis of In-memory Processing Architectures 42
4 Row Hammer Reducing Encoding Scheme 45
4.1 In-memory Data Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2 Encoding Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3 Encoding Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3.1 Alternative Encoding Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3.2 Comparisons with Error-Correction Codes . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3.3 Comparisons to logic/counter based approaches . . . . . . . . 51
4.4 Operation Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.5.1 Encoding and pPIM architecture characteristics . . . . . . . . 54
4.5.2 Encoding Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5.3 Encoding/Decoding Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.5.4 Pipelined RH-encoding scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.6 DRAM Design Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5 Conclusion and Future Work 63




1.1 In-memory Processing Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 3D Integration Stack [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Row Hammering Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Row Hammering Data Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Row Hammering Data Pattern Statistics [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.6 Attack and Defense Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1 Hybrid Memory Cube Integration Stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Single Tesseract Core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Message Triggered Prefetching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 Weight Sensitivity of MLP and LeNet with Iris and MNIST Datasets 26
2.5 TWiCe Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1 Hierarchical view of the pPIM Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 Layout of the pPIM core architecture [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 Layout of the pPIM cluster architecture [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 Interconnect Router Architecture for n cores in a cluster [4] . . . . . . 33
3.5 MAC Operation Multiplication and Accumulation Stages . . . . . . . 35
3.6 Dataflow model within a pPIM cluster for both (a) 8-bit full precision
and (b) 4-bit half precision unsigned MAC operations [3] . . . . . . . 35
3.7 Dataflow Model within a pPIM cluster for both (a) 16-bit precision
and (b) 8-bit precision ReLU activation operations [3] . . . . . . . . . 36
3.8 Dataflow Model within a pPIM cluster for both (a) 16-bit precision
and (b) 8-bit precision Saturated ReLU activation operations [3] . . . 36
3.9 FPGA MAC and Classification Regions within FPGA Implementation
of pPIM architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.10 Communication Model between ZC702 Evaluation Board and End Device 39
3.11 Comparison of (a) throughput and (b) power consumption of various
architectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.12 Comparison of (a) area and (b) efficiency/area of various architectures 41
3.13 Weight Vulnerability Heatmap on the MNIST dataset . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1 Proposed Encoding Scheme for handling RH attacks . . . . . . . . . . 45
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
4.2 Model of the interface between the RH-encoding scheme with pPIM
Clusters and memory elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3 Original Encoding Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.4 Dual 3-to-4 Encoding Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.5 Uncorrectable multi-bit errors (in bold) [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.6 Sequential model of both encoding and decoding operations on the
pPIM architecture including (a) encoding sequential model and (b)
decoding sequential model. The inputs ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ indicate input
to the cluster from memory with the high and low segments of memory
dictated by the subscripts ‘H’ and ‘L’, respectively. The input and the
output of the encoding and decoding schemes are dictated by ‘A’ for
encoding and ‘U’ for decoding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.7 Encoding Functionality Comparison of (a) AlexNet, and (b) VGG-16,
with and without encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.8 Comparison of (a) throughput and (b) power consumption of various
CNN algorithms with and without RH-encoding scheme . . . . . . . . 58
4.9 Pipelined Sequential model of both encoding and decoding operations
on the pPIM architecture including (a) encoding sequential model and
(b) decoding sequential model. The inputs ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ indicate
input to the cluster from memory with the high and low segments of
memory dictated by the subscripts ‘H’ and ‘L’, respectively. The input
and the output of the encoding and decoding schemes are dictated by
‘A’ for encoding and ‘U’ for decoding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.10 Comparison of throughput of various CNN algorithms with and with-
out pipelined RH-encoding scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.11 DRAM Coupling Capacitance vs. Number of Row Hammer Attacks . 62
viii
List of Tables
3.1 Synthesis Results for pPIM Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1 Row Hammer Encoding Truth Table Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2 Read Core Functionalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.3 Synthesis Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56





Traditional von Neumann Architectures consist of a central processing unit (CPU)
and memory unit separated via interconnects; data is transferred between these units
in which one involves computation and the other storage. Interconnects are responsi-
ble for transporting data from one unit to the other to allow the architecture to func-
tion properly. As the technology node improves, interconnects have higher amounts
of resistivity, capacitance, and inductance; in addition, the rate at which processing
speed is improving is significantly higher than the rate at which memory speed is im-
proving. The constant transfer of data over interconnects results in large latency and
high power-consumption, leading to the proposal of an in-memory processing unit.
A limitation of the von Neumann Architecture involves the rates at which both
processing speed and memory are improving. Computing power has sped up in the
recent years whereas fetching data from memory has lagged behind, instead, focusing
on memory density; processors are improving at a rapid pace but are trivial if data
is not fetched at an appropriate rate. Moore’s Law exhibits that a gap of about 50%
between computing and memory power is growing per year, creating a memory wall
scenario [5]. As applications continue to improve in parallel with the technology node,
the demand for both higher computational and memory performance increases. Data-
2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
driven applications such as artificial intelligence and brain-inspired computing utilize
CNNs and DNNs which require intense and exhaustive computations; these processes
include video or image processing purposes and utilize linear algebra multiplication
of vectors and matrices. Data is continuously offloaded from and written to memory
with CNN and DNN operations, incrementing latency.
Another issue that deals with von Neumann Architectures includes the resistiv-
ity, capacitance, and inductance of interconnects [6]. Resistivity increases as a result
of the length and thinness of the wire as the technology node scales; in addition,
metal lines run over thick oxide covering the substrate, resulting in both higher lev-
els of resistance and capacitance. Capacitance increases as results of area, lateral,
and fringe capacitance within wire dimensions. Furthermore, Miller’s Effect, which
involves coupling capacitance creates additional capacitance based on signal values in
adjacent wires. If signals do not switch in the same direction amongst adjacent wires,
additional or parasitic capacitance is tacked onto to the base capacitance of intercon-
nect, resulting in higher capacitance and overall higher delay and power-consumption.
As the technology node improves, interconnects get thinner, resulting in fewer resis-
tance but larger inductance, increasing frequency and the use of coppers in wires [1].
These three factors positively correlate with latency and power consumption; more-
over, the usage of CNNs and DNNs involve millions of operations in which data is
continuously transported over interconnects, causing a greater amount of latency and
power-consumption added to the traditional von Neumann Architecture.
In-memory processing is a proposed solution to the memory and interconnect
bottlenecks exhibited in contemporary Von Neumann Architectures, as operating
within or near memory reduces both the distance data has to travel from and to
memory along with quicker data fetching. Processing in or near memory utilizes
accelerators, or small cores or processors on memory, typically DRAM, allowing logic
to occur within the memory unit [5]. In the fabrication process, in-memory processors
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and memory are closely coupled, in which a machine has several processors that share
the same amount of memory, consequently improving the memory transfer rate and
memory bandwidth while both latency and power-consumption can be minimized.
Processing-in-memory (PIM) is a quite innovative idea that explores the union of both
memory and processing units, decreasing latency and reducing power consumption.
Figure 1.1 illustrates a type of architecture of in-memory processing.
Figure 1.1: In-memory Processing Architecture
Some novel forms of interconnects may be used to serve a purpose within in-
memory processing such as 3D, photonic, and on-chip wireless interconnects. 3D
Integration is an emerging interconnect that involves stacking chips, creating multiple
layers; this saves both space and power consumption within an integrated chip [7].
However, heat dissipation is a common problem within 3D Integration since chips
are stacked closely and densely as possible. Figure 1.2 shows a 3D Integration stack
example.
In addition to 3D integration, photonic networks utilize electronic packet-switched
networks to operate network on chip (NOC) architectures, which is typically used and
integrated via 3D integration, further reducing power-consumption. However, ongoing
4
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Figure 1.2: 3D Integration Stack [1]
research is required to investigate photonic NOCs [8]. On-chip wireless interconnects
utilize wireless or RF signals to communicate parts of a processing unit without
interconnects via transmission lines. Although interconnect-less, long transmission
line routing may cause latency issues and signal drops through transmission. Several
of these solutions can be implemented to form an in-memory processing unit.
1.2 Row Hammering (RH) Security Attack
As the technology node scales, the separation between memory cells decreases, forcing
rows of memory to be closer to one other. As rows are continually accessed, the charge
within cells of certain rows can leak due to continual pre-charge and activation of the
memory cell capacitors, flipping bits within cells of adjacent rows without accessing
them [2] .
Row-hammering (RH) occurs between two consecutive refreshes of DRAM; this
is due to capacitive interference between two adjacent memory rows [9]. Whenever a
row is switched or accessed frequently, the capacitive interference causes the cells in
5
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adjacent rows to slightly charge or discharge. When repeatedly toggling/accessing a
certain row, due to how close the rows are (typically below 35 nm) and how charge
can easily jump due to electrical interference, adjacent rows can be activated without
access due to charge affecting their wordlines (electromagnetic coupling) [2]. Using
this, a complete attack model can be designed in which the attacker program con-
tinuously and repetitively activates and precharges a certain row(s) of DRAM. This
repetitive action eventually alters the values stored in the cells of adjacent rows (upper
or lower). Figure 1.3 exhibits a double-sided row hammer attack.
Figure 1.3: Row Hammering Example
In addition to Figure 1.3, a simple x86 Assembly Code, shown below also simulates
the Row Hammer Attack as it can only occur in the same bank of memory [2].
code1a:
mov (X), %eax // read from address X
mov (Y), %ebx // read from address Y
clflush (X) // flush cache for address X





The code above alternates the accesses to two different rows (but on the same bank
of memory); in addition, memory read is not from the same row and the content of the
row cannot be used. Since an activation to both rows occur via the ’mov’ commands
are right after one another, a Row Hammer Attack can occur. However, alternating
the code below such as below will not simulate a Row Hammer Attack [2].
code1b:
mov (X), %eax // read from address X
clflush (X) // flush cache for address X
mfence
jmp code1b
The code above does not simulate the Row Hammer attack because there is no
access to another row in memory; the data will be served from the row buffer in
memory since there is no need to reactivate the row; therefore, the Row Hammer
attack only occurs via activation, not accessibility. In addition, the Row Hammer
attack occurs within the refresh window, typically 64 ms, only in the same bank of
memory but different rows [2].
In commodity DRAM chips, around 9600 row activations are required to simulate
the RH attack [10]; the bug can attack via two methods: single-sided and double-
sided; the effects of RH attacks are similar to those of cross-talk effects displayed
between interconnects [11]. In the double-sided case, rowhammer occurs via continu-
ous activation and pre-charge of the two outer rows, causing bits flips in the middle
row or the inner or middle row is the aggressor row, causing bits to flip without being
accessed in the above or below rows. In the single-sided case, rowhammer occurs
via only one aggressor row and one victim row, with one aggressor row ’hammering’
the victim row. Attackers can either have the information of the virtual to psychical
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mapping of the system (Whitebox RH Attack), allowing for a less brute-force tactic
and higher chance of successful data corruption or they may not have the mapping,
which may also corrupt data in a more forceful manner (Blackbox RH Attack) [12].
Furthermore, the rowhammer security bug has a data pattern dependence, indicat-
ing that the organization of data in DRAM is critical to the security of the system.
Four data patterns exist: Solid, ColStripe, RowStripe, and Checkered. Figure 1.4
below displays the four data patterns [2].
Figure 1.4: Row Hammering Data Pattern
Amongst all data patterns, the RowStripe pattern exhibits the worst-case scenario
for rowhammer attacks. In 2014, commodity DRAM were put under the rowhammer
attack with all four data pattern dependencies to indicate which data pattern had the
highest number of bit flips [2]. Figure 1.5 below shows the results of the rowhammer
attack on all four data pattern dependencies on three manufacturers of DRAM [2].
Figure 1.5: Row Hammering Data Pattern Statistics [2]
Row-hammering induces errors such as privilege separation, system crashes, a
8
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hijack of control of the system, and error injection. Google has actually exploited
the poor scaling of DRAM via the Row Hammer bug to gain kernel privileges by
repeatedly accessing rows causing bit flips; such privileges can be given to the wrong
user, potentially causing a reverse-engineering based security issue.
Inspired by [13], researchers from Google Project Zero demonstrated that row
hammer attacks can be exploited at the user-level to gain kernel privileges on real
systems. One exploit involved running a Native Client (NaCl) program and escalated
privilege to escape the x86-64 sandbox environment. Another exploit runs as a normal
x86-64 process on Linux and escalates privilege to gain access to all of the physical
memory mapping and hijack the entire system. The attacker hammers a page table
entry (PTE) in memory. This changes the PTE to point to a page table owned by the
attacking process. This gives the attacking process full read-write access to its own
page table and hence to all of physical memory, which enables the attacking process
to take over the entire system.
Drammer investigates the vulnerability of mobile devices to the RH attack [14].
Drammer investigates the effects of row hammer attacks on ARM-based mobile de-
vices. [14] takes advantage of the deterministic memory allocation patterns in the
Android Linux Operating System. Via deterministic memory allocation patterns, a
methodology is proposed for forcing a victim process to allocate its PTE in a RH-
vulnerable region of memory. This involves the attacker process to allocate all possible
memory regions for a page table allocation and then release the page table allocation
that contains the RH-vulnerable DRAM cells at bit offsets that enable exploitation.
[14] discovered 18 out of 27 phone models to be vulnerable to the RH attack and have
since released a mobile application that tests memory for RH-vulnerable cells and
aggregates statistics on how widespread the RH phenomenon is on mobile devices.




[15] involves RH attacks that includes hijacking mobile systems by triggering the
RH attack using the WebGL interface on a mobile GPU, takeover of a remote system
by triggering the attack through the Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) protocol
and various other attacks [15]. The RH attack has widespread and profound real
implications on system security, as it breaks memory isolation on top of which modern
system security principles are built.
Various solutions such as counter and probabilistic based approaches, along with
new additional components, have been taken to address row-hammering issues. Counter-
based approaches involve placing counters along each DRAM row to monitor the
amount of activations until a threshold has been met [16]; probabilistic solutions in-
volves auto-refresh techniques within DRAM such that the topmost entry is reset to
its original value regularly. Pruning is also a technique in which the aggressor rows
are recorded in a table and the least aggressive rows are pruned out continuously from
the table to find the most aggressive row [17].
1.3 The Effects of Row Hammer Attack on In-Memory Pro-
cessing
Security of data is essential to any architecture, network, or system of operations;
recently, the novel row hammering security bug was discovered in which bits of data
can be flipped without access [9]. The continuous pre-charge and activation of rows
causes charge to propagate to adjacent rows and flip bits of data, causing host privilege
escalation issues, incorrect qualitative/quantitative information, and possibilities of
attacks on networks, including CNNs and DNNs [13].
Weights stored in both CNNs and DNNs are subject to security vulnerabilities such
as the Row Hammer Attack, as they are stored within memory, typically DRAM; as
the Row Hammer Attack flips bits of memory without access, the weights are vulner-
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able to this, comprising memory information as well as manipulating the accuracy of
a network.
An attack model composes of an attacker that either knows or does not know the
virtual to physical memory mapping. If the attacker does not the know mapping, a
brute-force tactic would occur, effectively pre-charging and activating random rows to
damage the network. However, if the attacker does know virtual to physical memory
mapping, with a knowledge of the data pattern dependency, the attack on the network
can be severe as the structure in which the weights stored in memory can influence
the manner in which the Row Hammer Attack can occur.
Weights can be stored in a plethora of ways in memory, either horizontally or
vertically; however, the way they are stored can influence the likelihood of a Row
Hammer Attack occurring on the network. The four data pattern dependencies as
exhibited in Figure 1.4 shows all types of data patterns of weights. Out of the four
data patterns, the RowStripe data pattern, which exhibits rows alternating in 1s
and 0s, has a significantly highest probability of a Row Hammer Attack occurring
as compared to other three data patterns [2]. Investigating the effects of the data
patterns on the weights stored in the network can mitigate the effect of the Row
Hammer Attack, particularly looking into the effects of the RowStripe data pattern.
As the RowStripe data pattern has the highest likelihood of a Row Hammer Attack
occurring on a network, minimizing the effects of this data pattern specifically can
significantly reduce the chances of a Row Hammer attack affecting on a network.
Henceforth, we explore the the performance of a neural network along with the
sensitivity of its layers. In addition to layer sensitivity, a weight vulnerability analysis
is performed to determine which weights are subject to the RowStripe data pattern. A
RowStripe Avoidance Coding (RAC) scheme is proposed to encode the weights in the
network to remove the RowStripe data pattern in certain bit positions, specifically the
most vulnerable positions of the weight. An attack and defense model is represented
11
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
below in Figure 1.6.
Figure 1.6: Attack and Defense Model
The attack and defense model shown in the figure below is to be implemented to
avoid any RowStripe vulnerable data patterns in memory. The weights of a neural
network are encoded in the cloud and then stored within memory such that the
attacker cannot exploit the RowStripe vulnerable weights. Memory on the edge device
will store the encoded weights with the RowStripe Avoidance Coding Schemes and
decoding will be done within the cloud. The main contributions of this work are
the design of an original and unique coding mechanism as well as a creation of a
performance benchmark for the scheme to evaluate its effectiveness. In addition,
an evaluation of the bit error rate as well as additional hardware is implemented
to allow for proper data-flow of information securely, taking into consideration the
12
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In-memory processing is a potential solution to the von Neumann bottleneck, in which
both speed and energy are compromised due to the use of interconnects. Recently,
there has been an explorative effort on various PIM architectures.
LAcc is a look-up-table (LUT) based in-memory accelerator utilized to multiply
data in a unique manner [18]; many designs of PIM for multiplication do exist yet
many are not efficient as LAcc. LAcc utilizes multiplication decomposition as shown
below in Equation 2.1.
A ∗B + C ∗D = (A ∗B0 ∗ 20 + A ∗B1 ∗ 21) + (C ∗D0 ∗ 20 + C ∗D1 ∗ 21) (2.1)
In the above equation, A and C are the addends whereas B and D are the select bits
selected by the LUTs when performing multiplication decomposition; these calcula-
tions are used for CNN or DNN applications and are typically vector-based operations.
The table size of the LUT depends on the bit-length of the values to be multiplied.
To achieve proper multiplication decomposition and save LUT table space, LAcc uti-
lizes horizontal and vertical partitioning to split the vectorized values to multiply. An
14
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example of this is shown below in Equation 2.2.
(

































The LUT size for the equation above would be 28 (24 ∗ 24 = 28) bits. Without
horizontal or vertical partitioning, the LUT table size would have been 216 (28 ∗ 28 =
216) bits, saving a significant amount of space. LAcc is a PIM DRAM accelerator
that computes multiplicaton 6.3x fast than the current method of multiplication on
traditional Von Neumann Architectures [18].
The computational ideas shown in [18] resonate with that of approximate comput-
ing, in which a dynamic bit-width is used to compute to the accuracy of a machine
learning program (MLP) [19]. Using a shorter, or dynamic bit width, may aid in
improving power-consumption and limit accuracy loss. In-memory processors can
leverage the idea of having dynamic bit-widths to compute to further increase power-
consumption savings as well as limit latency in calculations all while minimizing
accuracy loss. Data can be split into segments, allowing for faster computation and
minimal power-consumption, used in multiple in-memory processing architectures.
pPIM is a programmable PIM architecture that combines processing of machine
learning networks such as CNNs and DNNs. CNNs and DNNs, such as AlexNet,
use millions of multiplication operations to compute image and video processing [4].
To simplify the operations, partial products are made out of the multiplication op-
15
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erations and all possible solutions are construed within a Lookup Table (LUT). For
example, two four-bit values are to be multiplied; therefore, the total number of pos-
sible outcomes of the multiplication operations is 256, or (24)2, since each value is
of four bits in binary. The LUT would be populated with all potential outcomes,
ranging from 0 to 255. The partial products of the two inputs would be created via
multiple addition operations, reducing the cycles needed to complete each addition
operation. Albeit there may be multiple additional operations within the core which
may cause further delay, the reduction of interconnects and use of LUTs will not only
compensate for the millions of operations, but it will also improve the performance
as compared to previous Von Neumann Architectures.
The Hybrid Memory Cube (HMC) is a hybrid Dynamic Random Access Memory
(DRAM) memory/logic structure created via 3D Integration in Very-large-scale in-
tegration (VLSI) [20] [1]. 3D Integration is an emerging interconnect that involves
stacking chips, creating multiple layers; this saves both space and power consumption
within an integrated chip [7]. However, heat dissipation is a common problem within
3D Integration since chips are stacked closely and densely as possible.
The Hybrid Memory Cube utilizes this architecture to communicate between mem-
ory and logic in a revolutionary, faster, and power-efficient manner; furthermore, the
HMC is scalable, allowing for better bandwidth consumption as the system scales [1].
The Hybrid Memory Cube utilizes crossbar switching to communicate between
cores, or typically called vaults, within its own architecture. Each vault, or partition,
contains the logic implementation of the HMC, allowing for processing-in-memory to
occur, Figure 2.2 shows the Hybrid Memory Cube Integration Stack.
Computation occurs within each partition, which is within each bank of DRAM
chip. DRAM structure is composed of ranks, which is also known as a group of
chips. Within each chip, there are multiple banks; each bank has rows and columns
of memory cells, which are composed of a pass transistor and capacitor to store charge
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Figure 2.1: Hybrid Memory Cube Integration Stack
and access bit-/word-lines via charge stored in capacitors. Within the HMC’s banks,
there exist partitions where each processing unit lies, underneath the memory cells;
this completes the layering of the HMC.
Tesseract is a programmable PIM architecture that combines processing of ma-
chine learning networks such as CNNs and DNNs within graphs, such as traversals
and data collection of edges and vertices [21]. Tesseract utilizes the Hybrid Mem-
ory Cube Architecture via 3D Integration and its memory unit; however, it begins
to differ when it comes to its logic unit. Unlike the HMC, which utilizes a simple
logic system within its vault via multiple multiplexers over crossbar communication,
Tesseract’s processing unit contains a single-issue in-order core using message buffers
and prefetching techniques in order to utilize memory bandwidth in an efficient man-
ner. Furthermore, the programming interface allows for greater control over each core
in a vault [1].
Tesseract is composed of 8 GB DRAM layers, eight 40 Gb/s high speed serial
links, 32 slices (or vaults), and a single-issue in-order cube [21]. Figure 2.3 below
shows a Tesseract core within an HMC vault.
Tesseract has two ways of handling function calls: blocking function call and
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Figure 2.2: Single Tesseract Core
non-blocking function call.
Blocking function calls involve the core retrieving function arguments via the
network interface; upon retrieving the arguments, the core goes into interrupt mode
to isolate that process and computes its result in a special register. Once the result has
been computed within the special register, the core exits interrupt mode and transmits
the output to the remote core that requested the computation. The blocking function
call is typically used to check for global state changes; for example, a check on two
variables such as ”diff > a” [21]. A drawback to the blocking function call is that
each interrupt executed has latency since it is per one core at one time, not multiple
functions for multiple cores; furthermore, local cores are blocked until responses arrive
from the remote core [1].
Non-blocking function calls involve the core retrieving function arguments via the
network interface; however, the core will use its message queue feature to success-
fully complete not only one task at a time, but multiple tasks at a time. Function
arguments will continue to accumulate at the message queue until it is full; once the
queue is full, a “batch” interrupt will be executed to complete all the tasks in the
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queue, as well as taking into account dependence of tasks. The non-blocking function
has no return value and is typically used to update values within registers only [21].
Tesseract offers two methods of prefetching to retrieve function arguments (or
instructions): list prefetching and message triggered prefetching.
List prefetching involves traversing strides of a graph; a stride is a chronological
sequence of vertices or edges [21]. A stride prefetcher is used based on a reference
prediction table (RPT) that prefetches multiple cache blocks ahead to utilize high
memory bandwidth. The prefetcher operates on a loop-based mechanism that allows
storage of the address. Within the loop, the address is put into a list; it is then put
into the RPT as an entry if it conforms to a hint for the processor. This entry may
be removed if the processor is at the end of memory or stride and then removed from
the general list [1].
Message triggered prefetching is typically used over list prefetching; realistically,
stride access pattern is not the commonly used traversal [21]. Random access pattern
is used in more common-day graph processing. Furthermore, this works well with
non-blocking function calls because data is literally being prefetched to be accessed
by the function call. Initially, the network interface retrieves a message. This message
is then enqueued into the message queue and is requested by the message queue for a
prefetch; the message is then marked as “ready” and is then to be processed within
the core. Figure 2.4 shows the action of the message triggered prefetching [1].
A performance and energy comparison between conventional architectures (non
Von Neumann) and Tesseract was conducted, with Tesseract having a speedup of 9x
without prefetching techniques and 14x with prefetching techniques [21]. It has an
87% fewer energy consumption as compared to [20] and a bandwidth usage (perfor-
mance scalability) of 17.2 GB/s and 512 cores from 8.5 GB/s and 128 cores, respec-
tively [21]. The scalability of Tesseract gives PIM the ability to expand and scale
easily for larger environments [1].
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Figure 2.3: Message Triggered Prefetching
PIMSim is a flexible and detailed in-memory processing simulator that allows
users to evaluate and test actual processing-in-memory applications [22]. The advent
of heterogeneous aspects of processors have led to the rise of PIM simulators as pro-
cessing in data has two main advantages. In-memory computing logic has a much
higher internal bandwidth as compared to off-chip bandwidth and data movement
between the CPU and memory is reduced significantly, saving both power consump-
tion and latency issues. PIMSim allows users to track instructions per cycle (IPC)
dynamically to compare how fast an instruction is computed in-memory as compared
to a traditional Von Neumann Architecture; in addition, the in-memory logic can also





As the technology node improves, memory components gradually become denser and
closer to one another, leading to issues such as charge leakage and movement. When
repeatedly toggling/accessing a certain row of memory, due to how close the rows are
and how charge can easily jump, adjacent rows can be activated without access due
to charge affecting their wordline (electromagnetic coupling) on the same banks of
memory but different rows, known as the rowhammer security bug [2]. This novel
security bug can attack either one row or two rows of memory, with the worst case
as one row, the middle row as the victim, and the two adjacent rows surrounding
it as the aggressors, known as a double-sided rowhammer attack; other attacks can
occur where only one aggressor and one victim row, known as a one-sided rowhammer
attack.
The rowhammer attack is a large problem that affects memory devices, typically
newer DRAM chips are far more susceptible to RH attacks since fewer activations on
rows are required to induce the attack, typically around 9600 activations [10]. [10]
investigates three types of DRAM to analyze how the rowhammer attack affects each
one: DDR3, DDR4, and LPDDR4. Between the three types of memory, DDR4, the
newest of the three, suffers the most from rowhammer issues because of feature scaling
via technology nodes. However, DDR3 did not suffer as much as it an performing
on a significantly older technology node; therefore, some measurement values do not
include DDR3 as some cases did not exhibit RH attacks at all. Initially, data pattern
dependency is first checked with four types of data pattern exhibited in memory:
solid (either all 0’s or all 1’s), row-stripe (alternating rows of 1’s and 0’s), col-stripe
(alternating columns of 1’s and 0’s), and checkered (alternating rows and columns
of 1’s and 0’s). The row-stripe data pattern exhibits the worst case data pattern
(highest vulnerability to the rowhammer attack) [10]. This is mainly due to opposite
21
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
magnitudes of charge in rows as compared to other ones which exhibit more similar
magnitudes of charge. Another vulnerability aspect looked into was hammer count
(HC). [10] shows a linear relationship between the number of attempts of RH attacks
along with HC, indicating that as there are a larger number of potential RH attempts
as the HC count increases. In addition to HC count, RH spatial effects were looked
into as well with DDR3 data values only affected in the victim row location, DDR4
mainly affected in the victim row location (20% on two rows away), and LPDDR4
mainly affected in rows further away from victim rows (20% two rows away, 10% four
rows away, and 60% six rows away). DRAM cells that fail with the least amount
of accesses were also looked into with newer chips, such as DDR4, experiencing only
20,000 HC counts for the first bit flip as compared to DDR3 and LPDDR4, which had
bit flips at around 65,000 and 25,000, respectively [10]. The effects of error correcting
codes (ECC) were also analyzed on the three different types of memory, with HCfirst
counts decreasing by 2.78x in DDR4-old and DDR4-new DRAM chips, and 1.65x in
DDR3-new DRAM chips [10].
Attackers can exploit the rowhammer security bug, leading to privilege escala-
tion, shell injection, memory and disk corruption, and advanced Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks. If the specific state of a privileged software module is vulnerable
to a rowhammer attack, an attacker can repeatedly try to corrupt that state via
’hammering’ the cells which store that target state in memory. The Rowhammer
Attack Injection (RAI) serves as a framework created to identify, validate, and eval-
uate rowhammer attacks target states [12]. The rowhammer attack can be classified
into two categories: Whitebox RH attacks and Blackbox RH attacks. Whitebox RH
attacks consist of attackers having prior knowledge of the virtual to physical mapping
of the system and allowing for less brute force attacks, typically leading to a higher
chance of successful corruption of data. Blackbox RH attacks involve attackers not
having prior knowledge of virtual to physical mapping information, creating more
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brute forced attacks, typically leading to lower chances of successful corruption of
data [12].
The rowhammer attack injection (RAI) methodology consists of multiple steps
beginning with the attacker identifying the memory blocks, having at least one ag-
gressor row and victim row. The attacker can then pressure that state of memory
by allocating nearly all of its available physical memory space such that no one else
can allocate the aggressor and victim rows. Once the aggressor and victim rows are
selected and allocated, a fork process on that target state of memory is introduced
to store data structures of targeted states where the victim cell is. The rowhammer
attack is then introduced onto the memory, exploiting and corrupting the state of
memory. Finally, the attacker ends with concealing and cleaning up the data after
tampering with the data [12].
Security aspects of machine learning algorithms are also overlooked in terms of
the RH attacks. Attackers with access to CNN or DNN weight values stored in mem-
ory can cause significant system malfunction or disruption such as accuracy drops,
damaging the effectiveness of the classifier. Both CNNs and DNNs store weights in
memory, which are subject to the RH attacks. A vulnerability analysis of neural
networks using weight sensitivity was pursued to study the effects of the rowhammer
security bug on the memory. Both a weight sensitivity analysis and weight replace-
ment attack were implemented to simulate a rowhammer attack on a CNN’s or DNN’s
stored weights [23]. The weight sensitivity analysis allows attackers to analyze the
vulnerablity of weights of trained neural networks with respect to accuracy and mis-
classification. The weight sensitivity algorithm as shown below indicates an amount
value which is used to scale the weights in a certain layer of the neural network and
verify the accuracy of the network based on that scaling. By going through each layer
via the vulnerability algorithm, the layer with the largest accuracy drop indicates it






for W in layer_i do





The weight replacement attack below replaces few weights based on their sensitivity
during run-time for misclassification in neural networks. The algorithm below shows
the Weight Replacement Attack as described in [23].
Weight Replacement Attack
threshold = 0.1; amount= 0.5 ;Configurable by the user
input = (accuracy’, W)
sort(accuracy’, W);
for W, i in layer _i do
if accuracy’[i] < threshold then
break;
else
W’ [i] = W[i] * amount;
model’ = save( model’, W’ [i]);
cascaded_accuracy’ = test(model’, test_set);
if cascaded_accuracy < threshold then
W’[i] = W[i] * amount;
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model’ [i] = save( model’, W’ [i]);
else








In the algorithm above, a random preset value ’amount’ is used to scale weights in
the most vulnerable layer to see accuracy per layer. The weights are then sorted in
terms of significance with the loop going across each weight in every layer to find
which specific weight decreases accuracy to pre-selected accuracy chosen via the user.
The algorithm ends when the accuracy, based on the scaled weight, matches the pre-
selected accuracy value. A cascaded array of accuracy values is used to store the
accuracies calculated via each weight modification. If the cascaded accuracy value is
less than the threshold, the algorithm stops and returns the most recent model with
the weight modifications.
In [23], both algorithms were tested upon two DNN’s, LeNet and a simple Multi-
layer Perceptron (MLP), with Iris and MNIST as training datasets. Both algorithms
were used to see how manipulating weights, such as simulating a row hammer attack,
on both neural networks would affect the accuracies of both of these networks. Scal-
ing weights with values such as 0.0 - 1.0 on both networks resulted in accuracy drops
over 30% for the MLP network with Iris dataset for both input and output layers,
but very little accuracy drop for LeNet’s convolutional layer. A collection of plots
from [23] below show the accuracy drops based on weight scaling in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.4: Weight Sensitivity of MLP and LeNet with Iris and MNIST Datasets
Input and output layers seemed to be the most vulnerable layers in neural networks
as compared to the inner layers such as convolutional or pooling layers. Moreover,
accuracy drops in neural networks increase linearly with the number of weights mod-
ified with more complex networks taking longer times to attack to achieve a desired
accuracy drop.
Various solutions to correcting damages done by the row hammer attack have
been implemented, ranging from counter-based techniques, register clock drivers, row
shuffling, and encoding [9].
Counter and probabilistic based approaches have been taken to address row-
hammering issues. A counter-based approach involves placing a counter along each
DRAM row and incrementing each activation until it reaches the threshold value; at
this moment, the row would then be refreshed, preserving the values of the bits in
that row. Although this method is logical, the placement of counters along each row
would increase the area overhead, causing a larger die and higher power consumption
[24] [9].
Another counter based approach dealt with assigning counters to the top and
bottom rows, respectively [16]. Based on the row activations, rows are marked as
either “warm” or “cold”. Rows marked as “warm” will then be further investigated via
child counters spawned by the parent counter within adjacent rows. These counters
will continually monitor the row activations for that row and those adjacent around
it; once a row reaches the row that has hit the row-hammering threshold, all child
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and parent counter-monitored “warm” rows will be refreshed, allowing for a reduction
of power and fewer counters as compared to counter per row based method in [24].
However, both of these methods require using a row-hammering threshold value which
can be reverse-engineered by an adversary [9].
In addition, disturbance bin counters (DBCs) are another counter-based mecha-
nism used to aid in row hammer attacks [25]. DBCs recieve copies of every row activa-
tion or auto-refresh command issued via DRAM. The disturbance counters maintain
the number of ’disturbances’ of every row in the bin (a set of rows) since the row’s
last refresh. DBCs have a 1,024-entry DBC table that can be installed into a mem-
ory controller to track the detection of DRAM disturbance errors or row hammering
errors. A simple hashing function, using the rank index, bank index, and generated
row address, are used to create the bin address in the DBC table. If the DBC table
accumulates the number of disturbances in the bin to be over a certain threshold, an
alarm is set and the row is auto-refreshed such that no values are harmed due to any
disturbances. Grabbing a larger set of rows, compared to looking at one at a time,
allows for a quicker time to identify if a row hammer attack occurs [9].
TWiCe, an alternative solution, utilizes fewer counters and proposes a method to
counter row-hammering using a register clock driver. A table is used to store entries of
rows which are to be pruned if these rows are not accessed that much; furthermore, a
buffer and control logic scheme are also implemented within the register clock driver.
Figure 2.6 displays the architecture of TWiCe [17] [9].
DRAM would receive a command and address from the memory controller such
as an activation or access command. If the address has never been seen before, a
new table entry is allocated within the TWiCe table for the entry (typically 6 bytes)
[17]. Pruning is then done to ensure only a certain number of addresses are stored
to avoid table over-sizing. If the row activation count, which is checked via the
TWiCe counter, exceeds the row-hammering threshold, adjacent rows are refreshed
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Figure 2.5: TWiCe Architecture
and the entry is deallocated. For each entry in the table, the row is considered to
be an aggressor candidate if the number of activations exceed the pruning interval
threshold; otherwise, the row is not considered a valid entry within the table. The
number of counters required for TWiCe is limited as compared to other counter based
approaches since row-hammering only occurs during the refresh window. Electrons
are reset during the refresh window; therefore, electrons could be piled up due to
row-hammering attack. TWiCe uses the register clock driver to avoid table over-
sizing, per-DIMM protection, and is scalable for multiple types of environments. The
addition of TWiCe between the memory controller and memory component requires
a minimal additional energy of 82 pJ per count and 663 pJ per table update and
there is a negligible amount of performance overhead [17] [1].
DRAM address remapping improves both hardware efficiency of row and column
decoders as well as hides DRAM address spaces better, improving overall security.
[26] discusses a novel solution to the row hammer attack which involves a two-level
DRAM address remapping to reduce the rowhammer errors. It involves remapping
address in the chip-level and remapping addresses inside a chip via two remapping
matrices which keep track and shuffle the bits via splitting the input address into
most significant bits (MSBs) and least significant bits (LSBs), making every but in
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a word to be originated from a different address. Finally, it uses an error correcting
code (ECC) to correct any errors detected. Eleven memory modules were tested on
to verify if the swapping of arrays was sufficient enough to detect and reduce the
number of row hammer attacks.
Bit-Flip Attack (BFA) detection framework is proposed via weight encoding by
leveraging spatial locality of bit flipping as well as fast encoding for vulnerable weights
[27]. Initially, a weight sensitivity analysis is done via gradient information within
the weights of the neural network. A detection secret-key, or encoding of the weight,
is generated to encode sensitive weights and a detection code is generated to calculate
the hamming distance between the current detection code and original detection code
on the cloud compared to the edge device. The Hamming distance tells the number of
positions at which corresponding symbols are different, allowing for a false bit to be
detected during transmission, indicating a row hammer attack. If the model is under
a BFA, then retraining the DNN model for a few epochs aids in recovering the original
accuracy. Three networks, ResNet-20, Resnet-34, and MobileNet were run under the
BFA framework with transmission between the cloud and edge device, taking into
account the hamming distance and number of bit-flips [27]. Figure 2.7 below shows
the plot of the three networks, ten models of each, under the BFA detection framework
with both CIFAR-10 and ImageNet as datasets. The Hamming Distance and number
of bit-flips did not differ by much, indicating that accuracy of detection of BFA could
be higher for malicious networks (more vulnerable weights) as compared to benign
networks (less vulnerable weights) which exhibited little to few bit-flips, indicating the
gradient information may be a plausible method in determining sensitivity of weights
and layers. Accuracy recovery was also measured in which the three networks were
modeled under significant bit-flip attacks and then retrained for a few epochs to
recover back up from around 0.1%-10% to 67.68%-88.58% [27].
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Figure 3.1: Hierarchical view of the pPIM Architecture
pPIM is the proposed PIM architecture used for for computing data-intensive
applications. It operates via reprogrammable LUTs to perform a wide variety of
applications with very little overhead. The hierarchy of the proposed architecture
is depicted in Figure 3.1. The pPIM architecture is composed of a pPIM cluster at
the top level. Each cluster contains multiple pPIM cores that can be reprogrammed
within the architecture.
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3.1 Programmable In-memory Processing core
Figure 3.2: Layout of the pPIM core architecture [3]
The pPIM core is the base computing element of the pPIM architecture. The
pPIM core design is shown in Figure 3.2. The pPIM core handles a majority of the
computational power within the pPIM architecture. Processing within the core is
handled through the LUTs into the multiplexers. Repgrommability is also handled
within the pPIM core via a register file that feeds into the LUTs.
A plethora of functions can be used via the pPIM core(s). A function of either two
4-bit inputs or a single 8-bit input can be programmed into the pPIM core. Inputs
can be viewed as either the high or low segments if containing a single operand.
The usage of an array of LUTs that form eight 256-to-11 multiplexers allows for this
functionality. The register file contains the data to be served as the input to the
multiplexers. However, the select lines of the multiplexers are determined by the two
input vectors to the pPIM core.
Eight function words exist within the pPIM core’s register file. Each of the func-
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tion words are eight bits in length to fit the input to the 256-to-1 multiplexers. Each
of function words are then associated with a single bit position within the output of
the pPIM core.
3.2 Programmable In-memory Processing Cluster
Figure 3.3: Layout of the pPIM cluster architecture [3]
The pPIM cluster serves as the top-level element in the pPIM architecture. Figure
3.3 shows the layout of the pPIM cluster architecture. The pPIM cluster contains
nine pPIM cores, interconnected via a router. The router is implemented via a group
of multiplexers that replicates a SPIN interconnect model. The pPIM cluster can
perform more complex operations over a single or multiple stages via multiple pPIM
cores operating in tandem. Operations that require greater resolution can exist via
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the usage of multiple pPIM cores operating together.
Each pPIM cluster contains nine pPIM cores used for computation. The pPIM
cores within a pPIM cluster are separately programmed, creating a flexible design for
various applications. An all-to-all communication network with minimal overhead is
used to regulate the dataflow in the pPIM cluster via the usage. A crossbar switch
architecture is used to accomplish this task. The crossbar switch routing architecture
allows each pPIM core to receive input(s) from output(s) of any other pPIM cores
within the pPIM cluster. To match the size of the inputs and output of the pPIM cores
within the routing architecture, the 8-bit outputs are treated as two 4-bit segments.
3.3 Programmable In-memory Processing Router
Figure 3.4: Interconnect Router Architecture for n cores in a cluster [4]
The pPIM router handles the data-flow between nine cores in the pPIM architec-
ture. Figure 3.4 shows the interconnect router architecture for n cores in a cluster.
The routing mechanism aids in data communication amongst the cores. It is imple-
mented with 10:1 4-bit MUXes which form a SPIN interconnection fabric.
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3.4 Programmable In-memory Processing Function Word Gen-
eration
The functionality of the pPIM core is generated via eight function words. The output
of the pPIM core is based on the eight function words. The process must pass over 256
possible input pairings to determine an entire function word. During each pass, the
bits of the output are split up and set in their respective function words at the index
of the current iteration. Although some operations require a greater resolution and
may not be achievable via one set of function words, the usage of smaller operations
can achieve the desired output resolution.
3.5 In-memory Processing Multiply and Accumulate Oper-
ations
The pPIM architecture is responsible for data-intensive operations such as CNN infer-
ences. CNN inferences consist of MAC (Multiply and Accumulate) operations. Both
functionality and flexibility can be observed in the pPIM architecture through MAC
operations.
MAC operations consist of both multiplication and accumulation. Multiplication
is computed through the usage of partial products. Accumulation is done via addition
of the partial products. Figure 3.5 shows the calculation of the MAC operation.
All upper and lower segments of the inputs are multiplied with each other to form
partial products. These partial products are then aggregated to determine the result.
Each partial product is placed into the accumulator to perform the MAC operation.
This can be done for both 8-bit full precision and 4-bit half precision. A dataflow
model of the MAC operation is shown in Figure 3.6 for both 8-bit full precision and
4-bit half precision.
34





































Y3 Y2 Y1 Y0
Figure 3.5: MAC Operation Multiplication and Accumulation Stages
Figure 3.6: Dataflow model within a pPIM cluster for both (a) 8-bit full precision and
(b) 4-bit half precision unsigned MAC operations [3]
3.6 In-memory Processing Activation Operations
CNN inferences also require the usage of activation functions to successfully accom-
plish inference. The mapped operations include ReLU, Linear, sigmoid, and tanh.
The ReLU activation operation can be accomplished within a single pPIM core.
Figures 3.7-3.8 depict the dataflow for the ReLU and saturated ReLU activation
functions.
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Figure 3.7: Dataflow Model within a pPIM cluster for both (a) 16-bit precision and (b)
8-bit precision ReLU activation operations [3]
Figure 3.8: Dataflow Model within a pPIM cluster for both (a) 16-bit precision and (b)
8-bit precision Saturated ReLU activation operations [3]
The pPIM architecture can handle CNN inferences completely with both MAC
operations and activation functions. Other functions such as sigmoid and tanh are
capable on the pPIM architecture as well.
3.7 Field Programmable Gate Array Implementation
An FPGA implementation of the pPIM architecture is proposed for validation. The
processing elements and dataflow through simulation of unsigned 8-bit mAC opera-
tions multiple pPIM cluster is used for validation. Classification is also handled by
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a pPIM cluster with a max-index dataflow. The FPGA implementation is used to
predict numbers within images with a single layer NN.
3.7.1 Technology Resources
The ZC702 base board is used to validate the pPIM architecture. The ZC702 is an
FPGA composed of both a programmable logic (PL) core and a processing system
(PS).
The Modified Standards and Technology (MNIST) dataset is used to train and
test the NN. There are 70,000 handwritten digit images, with 60,000 training images
and 10,000 testing images. Each image is of dimension 28 pixels by 28 pixels.
Google Keras is used to handle the training of the NN before moving on to the
FPGA. The Keras library provides access to the MNIST dataset for training to model
before using the FPGA for simulation and verification purposes.
3.7.2 Machine Learning Model
A single layer NN is used to train the MNIST dataset to be used on the pPIM
architecture. The NN consists of a fully connected layer with a softmax activation
function. The input image size is a 28x28 image. The output layer is a vector of
ten 8-bit unsigned integers, with each index corresponding to the range of possible
prediction outputs. The total number of parameters is 7,850, with 7,840 dedicated to
the single dense layer and 10 dedicated to the activation function. The NN is trained
for 5 epochs with a batch size of 128. A max-index operation is used to determine
the output of the NN.
3.7.3 In-memory processing Implementation
The FPGA implementation of the pPIM architecture is composed of two distinct
operations: MAC operations and classification (max-index) operations. The two
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regions within the FPGA implementation are show in Figure 3.9. Each operation is
allocated a separate region within the FPGA with no reconfiguration. This focuses
on the validation of how the pPIM architecture processes data. Each layer acts as
a finite state machine. Each layer tracks the input and output to the region and
beginning execution. When the cluster has its input ready, the state machine sends
a ‘start signal’ to begin execution. After the inputs are processed, the state machine
sends the output to the next region or memory.
Block Memory DMA
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Figure 3.9: FPGA MAC and Classification Regions within FPGA Implementation of
pPIM architecture
3.7.4 Communication
Communications between the host computer and elements on the ZC702 FPGA board
requires the use of two communication protocols: direct memory access (DMA) and
universal asynchronous receiver-transmitter (UART). The communication used be-
tween each of the elements is shown in Figure 3.10.
The PS on the board provides hardware for UART communication. Over the
UART communication, the end device is capable of communicating with the PS.
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Figure 3.10: Communication Model between ZC702 Evaluation Board and End Device
Image data is passed from the end device to the PS. The PS also handles sending
classification results back to the end device.
Both the PS and PL on the ZC702 board are capable of DMA. DMA on the PL
requires introducing IP provided by Xilinx that communicates the data to the pPIM
architecture. DMA is used to the transfer the image data to the pPIM architecture
and for the pPIM architecture to return a classification result.
3.8 Results
3.8.1 pPIM characteristics












The pPIM architecture is characterized using post-synthesis models using the
Synopsys Design Compiler at the 28 nm technology node. The pPIM characteristic
results are shown below in Table 3.1. The model includes both a synthesized model
of the pPIM core and the pPIM cluster. The LUT multiplexers are modelled using
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transmission gates, improving the area overhead of the design. In addition, an 8-
bit unsigned MAC operation is chosen to record the power and delay figures for the
pPIM cluster. Table 3.1 gives an accurate estimate for deep learning applications
that contain MAC operations.
3.8.2 Performance Evaluation
We compare the pPIM with both von Neumann architectures alongside other con-
temporary PIM architectures in terms of throughput (frames per second) and power
consumption for AlexNet inference in Figure 3.11. The representative von Neumann
devices to be compared includes a high-end CPU and GPU such as Intel Knights
Landing (KNL) [28] and Nvidia Tesla P100 [29], respectively. The PIM architectures
used for comparison include DRISA [30] and DrAcc [31], SRAM-implemented Neural
Cache [32], another LUT-based PIM implemented on the DRAM platform: LAcc [18]














































Figure 3.11: Comparison of (a) throughput and (b) power consumption of various archi-
tectures
A comparison of area and efficiency/area were also investigated for several archi-
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Figure 3.12: Comparison of (a) area and (b) efficiency/area of various architectures
As seen in Figures 3.11-3.12, the PIM architectures, especially pPIM, outper-
form the von Neumann architectures by a significant margin in throughput, power-
consumption, and area overhead. This is because, the PIMs can largely avoid the
overhead and latency associated with off-chip communications, unlike those of CPUs
and GPUs. pPIM offers 12.8x and 45x higher throughput and 125x and 107.5x more
power efficiency compared to P100 GPU and Knights Landing Processor, respectively.
The Look-up Table (LUT) based architectures, LAcc [18], and pPIM offers high
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throughput for the least amount of power consumption. DRISA [30], a DRAM-based
bitwise processing accelerator, outperforms LAcc and pPIM, albeit at a higher power
consumption. The pPIM architecture achieves better performance while consuming
less power than LAcc, even with the implementation of the proposed RH-encoding
scheme. This is due to the smaller scale of the LUTs utilized by the pPIM archi-
tecture as well as the efficient mapping of operations of our encoding and decoding
schemes across the parallel processing sequences inside the pPIM architecture. Due
to the superior performance and power efficiency of the pPIM compared to the other
architectures, we choose the pPIM as a case study to evaluate the effect of RH and
encoding.
3.8.3 Vulnerability Analysis of In-memory Processing Architectures
We perform a vulnerability analysis on the weights of a CNN trained under the
MNIST dataset [33]. We investigate the vulnerability of the weights on a single-layer
MLP. It consists of a single dense layer with a softmax activation function. The
input size is a 28x28x1 image. The total number of parameters is 7,850, with 7,840
dedicated to the single dense layer and 10 dedicated to the activation function. The
MLP was trained for 5 epochs with a batch size of 128. The reported accuracy of
the network was 88.45%. The vulnerability analysis looked upon the weights of the
dense layer as the majority of weights to be affected by the RH attack exist there.
For each digit in the MNIST dataset, an bit-flip attack was simulated on the MSB of
the exponent portion of the weights in the single dense layer to simulate a potential
RH attack. The network performance is calculated for each individual bit-flip and
not for all bit-flip attacks accumulated as some weights are found to be more sensitive
than others. Figures 3.13 represents error heatmap on the MNIST dataset using the
single layer MLP.
In Figure 3.13, the performance of the network is shown to degrade for each RH
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Figure 3.13: Weight Vulnerability Heatmap on the MNIST dataset
attack while classifying MNIST dataset. Due to the nature of MNIST frames, some
weights are more vulnerable to the RH attacks than others due to their relative
position within the frame. It can be observed that the largest drop in accuracy was
down to 29.35%, showcasing the potential damage RH can do on simply a single
layer CNN algorithm even for simple data sets like MNIST. The RH attack can
occur on any PIM architecture with larger architectures having a more susceptible
weights; henceforth, it is imperative to secure the weights to ensure the security of
PIM architectures. The MNIST dataset contains multiple frames with either having
the number or white-space in the frame. Some oscillations exist in the heatmap above
due to some weights mapping to white-spaces as compared to other weights mapping
to numbers. Weights that map to white-spaces that are flipped have less significance
to the overall accuracy of the network. This happens at regular intervals because
weights are scanned across the frame. When the weight is selected at edge of frame,
it is not subject to a change in accuracy as there is white-space at edges of frames.
When simulating the row hammer attack on these weights, there is very little impact
on the overall network. However, weights mapped to the actual digit within the frame
that are flipped have a significant impact on the overall accuracy of the network. A
43
CHAPTER 3. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF A PROGRAMMABLE
IN-MEMORY ARCHITECTURE
flip in these bits would cause inference to be more difficult and cause larger accuracy
drops as compared to white-space bit flips.
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Row Hammer Reducing Encoding Scheme
Figure 4.1: Proposed Encoding Scheme for handling RH attacks
The proposed RH-encoding scheme is designed to work within the pPIM archi-
tecture in securing data-intensive applications used in deep learning applications.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the input and output of the RH-encoding scheme. When it
comes to implementing the proposed RH-encoding, we found the pPIM [?] to be the
most suitable platform for multiple reasons. First, a PIM architecture is capable of
performing massively parallel encoding and decoded with very low latency and high
energy efficiency which makes it a better alternative than encoding based on an exter-
nal processor. Second, the LUTs in pPIM are programmable which makes it possible
to implement the encoding scheme without modifying the existing architecture or
adding new hardware to the pPIM.
45
CHAPTER 4. ROW HAMMER REDUCING ENCODING SCHEME
4.1 In-memory Data Mapping
As shown in Figure 3.1 (a), the pPIM clusters are arranged in rows in-between memory
subarrays. The weights and activations of CNNs are arranged inside the subarrays
and are processed in the nearest cluster. The clusters can each read a large batch of
such data operands (weights and activations) at a time. Since a CNN has a very large
number of parameters, these parameters are arranged across multiple memory rows,
prior to being read and processed inside the clusters. It is during this waiting period
that these data become vulnerable to potential row-hammering attacks. Data bits
across different memory rows can affect each other’s capacitance when a particular
row (attacker row) is activated repetitively. Therefore, the purpose of the encoding
scheme is to ensure that the relative charge state of any two memory cells from two
adjacent memory rows are such that the probability of capacitive interaction between
them and therefore the probability of row-hammering corruption is minimal.
4.2 Encoding Connectivity
As shown in Figure 3.1, the vertically aligned pPIM clusters are interconnected in
the pPIM architecture via interlinked bitlines [34]. These clusters can communi-
cate data-operands among each other and effectively implement a Stream Processing
architecture. We capitalize on these connectivity to include the Encoding and Decod-
ing process in the stream of operations. A page of data is first encoded by a pPIM
cluster programmed to execute the proposed encoding scheme and then stored in a
memory row to protect it from potential row-hammering attacks. Once the data is
required for the desired computational tasks, it is first send to a cluster programmed
to perform decoding. The decoded data is then forwarded to the actual processing
clusters via the interlinked bitlines. The encoding and the decoding clusters are just
regular-cluster programmed to perform these specific tasks. In fact, since encoding
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Figure 4.2: Model of the interface between the RH-encoding scheme with pPIM Clusters
and memory elements
and decoding is not performed simultaneously, we envision reprogramming the same
cluster dynamically for performing both tasks, sequentially, as shown in Figure 4.2.
4.3 Encoding Scheme
The proposed RH-encoding scheme is aimed at reducing the rate of data-corruption
from row-hammering attacks by encoding the bit-combinations that are the most
vulnerable to this attack. As discussed previously in Section 2, the row-stripe pattern
of the stored bits in adjacent memory rows are the most vulnerable ones. For this
purpose, we develop a coding scheme that investigates and encodes three rows of
weights. The exponent portion of the weights is encoded since a bit-flip produces the
highest amount of error. The coding scheme collects two triplet columns of weights,
particularly two columns of bits at a time, and encodes them into three triplets of
weights, or three columns of bits. The programming scheme for the cores in a cluster
for performing encoding is presented in Table 4.1.
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4.3.1 Alternative Encoding Schemes
Some alternative encoding schemes involved only taking the first two triplet columns
of weights. These two columns would be transposed and encoded into a nine-bit
output. Each triplet column would be encoded to another triplet value that does
not exhibit the row-stripe pattern. The three MSB bits would be a pattern common
to all encoded weights. Some advantages of this design involved fewer computation
achieve this encoding scheme as some values were fixed. However, decoding proves to
be difficult since only two triplet pairs are collected. Not all information is present to
successfully decode weights for inference. In addition, some triplet values could not
be converted to new triplet values as converting a three-bit space to another three-bit
space involved the row-stripe pattern appearing. Figure 4.3 illustrates this encoding
scheme below.
A dual 3-to-4 encoding scheme was also proposed which allow for 1-to-1 mapping
for encoding/decoding purposes. The first and fifth triplet columns would be encoded
but this time to two four-bit values making the total encoded value 8-bits long instead
of 9. The first and fifth triplet pairs were taken to account for both MSB and LSB
bits. Dual encoding allows prioritizing both MSB and LSB bits during encoding.
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Figure 4.3: Original Encoding Scheme
More unique encoding outputs to try and test out for best decrease in chance of
RH attacks. The 8-bit encoded output to substitute for the exponent portion of the
weights. In addition, this scheme allows for better disguising to have 8-bit output
as it can be directly substituted in for the 8-exponent bits in IEEE Floating Point
Format. Some drawbacks associated with this encoding scheme involved difficulty in
decoding as only two triplet columns out of the eight were collected. It would prove
impossible to decode as not all information is gathered. Figure 4.4 shows illustrates
encoding scheme below.
Figure 4.4: Dual 3-to-4 Encoding Scheme
The encoding scheme shown in Table 4.1 shows a six-bit to a nine-bit operation.
A parity of three bits are added during encoding since three rows of weights are
inputted and three rows of weights are outputted. A additional column of three bits
allows for the row-stripe pattern to be checked across every three rows successfully as
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the double-sided RH attack involves three rows of data. Double sided row hammer
attacks are checked by looking at three rows at a time. The addition of three parity
bits allow for proper investigation along with successful decoding.
The proposed encoding scheme will take up additional memory space. The pro-
posed scheme adds four new triplet columns of bits, resulting in 12 new bits for every
three weight values. As more bits of the weight are encoded, more memory space is
taken up. This scheme demands larger memory space to operate successfully. Larger
CNNs would require additional storage space to allow the encoding scheme to take
place, making it more difficult to store encoded weights.
Some alternative encoding schemes could involve encoding one triplet column at
a time to produce either one, two, or more columns of triplets. This could prioritize
more bit positions of weights as compared to the proposed scheme. This would
result at the minimum of eight new columns as compared to four. The addition of
more columns results in more design constraints as new columns consume even more
memory space compared to the proposed scheme. However, encoding larger groups
of triplets may reduce the number of new triplet columns formed. This allows for less
memory space to be consumed potentially at the cost of higher power consumption,
a larger decrease in throughput, and less prioritization of all bit positions.
4.3.2 Comparisons with Error-Correction Codes
In 2014, three DRAM manufacturers (A, B, and C) were subject to the row hammer
attack. All three DRAM manufacturers were equipped with the SECDED ECC
mechanism to correct and detect the row hammer errors. Figure 4.3 below shows the
results of the uncorrectable multi-bit errors (in bold) [2].
Most errors in the rows of A23, B11, and C19 are subject to the row hammer attack.
SECDED (Single Error Correction, Double Error-Detection) can only correct a single-
bit error within a 64-bit word. However, if a row contains two victims SECDED
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Figure 4.5: Uncorrectable multi-bit errors (in bold) [2]
cannot correct the resulting double-bit error. It can only detect them. If there are
three or more victims, SECDED can neither correct nor detect the multi-bit error,
leading to silent data corruption within memory [2]
The advantages of the proposed encoding scheme include securing all weights from
the row-stripe data pattern and can correct multiple bits in multiple segments of
weights. However, the proposed encoding scheme only prevents against row hammer
attacks. In contrast, the DRAM ECC looks into any particular bit flip in memory
and corrects it, regardless of its data pattern type. This could be for any type of
disturbance as well, regardless of row hammer. A significant disadvantage of DRAM
ECC is that errors still linger after one error correction as shown in Figure 4.3. This
means DRAM ECC does not secure data in memory against disturbance errors. A
greater ECC is most likely required to combat row hammer attacks, which come at a
cost of area, energy, performance, throughput, and DRAM capacity overheads.
4.3.3 Comparisons to logic/counter based approaches
A few logic/counter-based approaches to prevent row-hammering attacks have already
been proposed, mostly dominated by the usage of counters and a probabilistic ap-
proach. These approaches include Counter-based Activation (CBA), Counter-based
Tree (CBT), row remapping, probabilistic adjacent row activation (PARA), and Time
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Window Counter (TWiCe). However, common to all these approaches is the involve-
ment of complex and bulky intelligent logic circuitry to monitor and actively prevent
row-hammering corruption. Several works have proposed that actively prevent row-
hammering attacks. The common feature of these works is the presence of counters
to monitor the memory rows to detect an aggressor row and prevent successful row-
hammering attacks by taking interceptive measures.
One such counter-based activation (CBA) approach incorporates an intelligent
logic unit that monitors the activation of DRAM rows. Once the number of repeti-
tive activation reaches a certain threshold value; this intelligent unit refreshes the row
to preserve the stored bits in the row from corruption. Another similar work utilizes
a counter-tree (CBT) to actively prevent row hammer attacks. Based on a number of
activations, different rows are marked as either ‘warm’, or ‘cold’ and are continuously
monitored by the counter-tree. Once a row reaches the row-hammering threshold,
all ‘warm’ rows, in general, are refreshed by the counter-tree. This results in over-
all fewer counters and a reduced footprint compared to the previous work. Another
work leverages the ‘Time-window Counters (TWiCe)’ mechanism which features a
table that stores entries of rows and prunes the number of active memory rows to
track an aggressor row. For each table entry, the row is considered to be an aggressor
candidate if the number of activations exceeds the pruning interval threshold. The
number of counters required for TWiCe is limited as compared to other counter-based
approaches. All of these approaches do not require modifying any data in memory
and use simple hardware to detect row hammer attacks. The TWiCe approach uses
less additional hardware as compared to the other counter-based approaches. Some
downsides to these approaches involve the usage of additional hardware to monitor the
rows of memory. This reduces power consumption and throughput loss significantly.
In addition, more area is required to place the counters. This raises manufacturing
costs. In comparison, the proposed encoding scheme does not need additional hard-
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ware to encode the weights. It works within the existing architecture and can be
scalable to any other architecture.
PARA is a probabilistic logic based approach to counter row hammer attacks.
Each time a row is accessed, one of its adjacent rows is also statistically accessed with
some low assumed probability ’p’ [3]. If one row happens to be accessed repeatedly,
then it is statistically certain that the adjacent row will be accessed as well, assuming
’p’ is chosen carefully. Some advantages of PARA is that it does not require additional
hardware to work successfully, low power-consumption and high performance. In
comparison, the proposed encoding scheme also does not need additional hardware to
work successfully. It also has a low-power consumption and high throughput as well.
However, the proposed encoding scheme does not rely on an assumed probability to
encode data.
The proposed encoding mechanism is adopted such that the overhead translated
to the memory space in the PIM architectures. Memory is relatively abundant in a
majority of architectures whereas logic is expensive. Therefore, overhead in regards to
throughput, energy consumption, and area are minimized with the proposed encoding
scheme.
4.4 Operation Mapping
Our proposed encoding scheme is implemented on multiple stages inside pPIM clus-
ters. This requires the LUT cores in a cluster to be programmed in a specific way
to perform a desired set of operations. For the 8-bit encoding operation, four cores
are programmed as 4-bit read cores, two cores are programmed as 4-bit adders, one
core is programmed as a 4-bit encoding core, and one core is programmed as a 4-bit
write-back core. Each cluster can encode all triplet pairs in a cluster at once.
The three 8-bit inputs of the encoding operation are each split into pairs of 4-bit
segments, each denoting the row and upper or lower half of data. Three rows of data
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are accessed from memory and are split into low and high bits, corresponding to the
upper four or lower four bits of data, respectively. Data is sent through four read
cores of Type 1 (shown in Table 4.2) in which each one receives different bit-segments
of each of the four triplet pairs. The third row of data is then forwarded to the add
cores to concatenate with the different bit-segments for appropriate encoding format.
The triplet pair bits are then collected and sent to the encoding core. The encoded
data is forwarded to the write-back core to generate the ninth bit, identical to the
eighth bit. The encoding is done sequentially for each of the triplet pairs, resulting in
a total of eleven clock cycles to complete. The eleven-stage encoding and nine-stage
decoding routing is shown in Figure 4.6.
Data is decoded prior to performing CNN inference. The cluster previously used
for encoding is reprogrammed to perform decoding now. Two read cores of Type 2
(as shown in Table 4.2) are required for appropriate decoding format. Figure 4.6 (b)
displays the sequential model required for decoding. Three columns of bits represent
one triplet set to be decoded. The decoding core takes the format and recovers original
weight values sequentially.
Table 4.2: Read Core Functionalities
Read Core Type Output Input A Input B
1 0xx0 0xx0 Any 4-bit Value Any 4-bit Value
2 0xxx 0xxx Any 4-bit Value Any 4-bit Value
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Encoding and pPIM architecture characteristics
The encoding/decoding scheme and pPIM are characterized using post-synthesis mod-
els using the Synopsys Design Compiler at the 28 nm technology node. The hardware
synthesis and pPIM results are shown below in Table 4.3. It can be observed that
there is minimal overhead from the encoding scheme thanks to the micro-code-based
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Figure 4.6: Sequential model of both encoding and decoding operations on the pPIM
architecture including (a) encoding sequential model and (b) decoding sequential model.
The inputs ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ indicate input to the cluster from memory with the high and
low segments of memory dictated by the subscripts ‘H’ and ‘L’, respectively. The input
and the output of the encoding and decoding schemes are dictated by ‘A’ for encoding and
‘U’ for decoding.
implementation of the Control Unit. The encoding component utilizes more power
due to its higher latency values; however, the decoding component consumes fewer
wattage as it takes fewer clock cycles as compared to the encoding process.
In addition, Table 4.3 compares a MAC operation to the proposed encoding and
decoding operations. The MAC operation characteristics are displayed without the
usage of the encoding and decoding schemes. The encoding and decoding schemes
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both consume more power and have larger amounts of delay in comparison to the
MAC operation. More clock cycles are used to successfully encode the data. This
contributes to larger amounts of latency. In addition, more cores are used per clock
cycle in transporting data and performing operations. This demands a higher power
consumption. However, the active area consumed is much lower in comparison to the
MAC operation. This allows for minimal overhead to the pPIM architecture.
4.5.2 Encoding Functionality
We evaluate the functionality of the encoding design via number of vulnerable weights
before and after encoding. We evaluate the functionality of the RH-encoding on
two CNNs: AlexNet [35] and VGG-16 [36]. Figures 4.7 (a) and 4.7 (b) present the
comparison of vulnerable weights found within the two networks with and without
encoding for each triplet set (denoted as input/output bit positions) of weights within
AlexNet and VGG-16. It can be observed that the RH-encoding scheme successfully
decrease the number of vulnerable, or row-stripe, weights for a majority of triplet
pairs. However, there is an increase in the number of vulnerable weights for the final
triplet pair as the RH-encoding scheme favors bits towards the MSB as a bit flip
there would be less significant than a bit flip towards the most significant bits. Bit
patterns have a wider variety of data patterns towards the final triplet pair. The
proposed RH-encoding scheme may sometimes create a larger number of row-stripe
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patterns for the final triplet pair, but compensates and secures for the bits towards the
most significant bits, those that can be impacted the most via a bit-flip attack. The
proposed RH-encoding scheme successfully secures bits towards the MSB portion,
































































Figure 4.7: Encoding Functionality Comparison of (a) AlexNet, and (b) VGG-16, with
and without encoding
4.5.3 Encoding/Decoding Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of the pPIM architecture equipped with our proposed
encoding/decoding schemes alongside CNN inference. We evaluate the performance
of the pPIM configurations for four other CNNs: ResNet 18, ResNet 34, ResNet
50, and VGG 16. Figure 4.8 present the comparison of energy consumption and
performance throughput of CNN inferences with and without encoding/decoding.
It can be observed that the proposed encoding/decoding scheme offers both a low-
energy usage and a low drop in throughput due to a low computational workload from
our proposed encoding/decoding design. This highlights the merit of the proposed
encoding/decoding scheme on PIM-based architectures, reducing the total number of
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of (a) throughput and (b) power consumption of various CNN
algorithms with and without RH-encoding scheme
vulnerable weights within CNN algorithms with minimal energy and throughput.
4.5.4 Pipelined RH-encoding scheme
Our proposed encoding scheme can be implemented with fewer states inside the pPIM
cluster in a pipe-lined manner. Certain operations can take up portions of the clock
cycle during a stage. This allows for both encoding and decoding to be done in fewer
cycles and with multi-step operations within a clock cycle. The encoding operation
is reduced from eleven stages to eight stages. The deocoding operation is reduced
from nine stages to six stages. Figure 4.9 shows the pipelined RH-encoding operation
mapping scheme.
The pipelined RH-encoding scheme is characterized using post-synthesis models
using the Synopsys Design Compiler at the 28 nm technology node. The hardware
synthesis and pPIM results are shown below in Table 4.4.
It can be observed that there is a reduction in the latency of the encoding and
decoding operations. As compared to the latency values in Table 4.3, the latency
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Figure 4.9: Pipelined Sequential model of both encoding and decoding operations on the
pPIM architecture including (a) encoding sequential model and (b) decoding sequential
model. The inputs ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ indicate input to the cluster from memory with the high
and low segments of memory dictated by the subscripts ‘H’ and ‘L’, respectively. The input
and the output of the encoding and decoding schemes are dictated by ‘A’ for encoding and
‘U’ for decoding.
has decreased due to pipelining. This allows for the RH-encoding scheme to be
accomplished in a shorter amount of time with equal functionality on the pPIM
architecture.
We also evaluate the performance of the pPIM architecture equipped with the
pipelined encoding/decoding schemes alongside CNN inference. We evaluate the
performance of the pPIM configurations for four other CNNs: ResNet 18, ResNet
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34, ResNet 50, and VGG 16. Figure 4.10 presents the comparison of performance
throughput and energy consumption of CNN inferences with and without encod-
ing/decoding as energy consumption remains the same. It can be observed that the
proposed encoding/decoding scheme allows for higher throughput and fewer energy
consumption due to the fewer amount of stages as compared to Figure 4.8. This
highlights the merit of the pipelined encoding/decoding scheme on PIM-based ar-
chitectures, reducing the total number of vulnerable weights within CNN algorithms
with minimal energy consumption and throughput.
4.6 DRAM Design Analysis
As the technology node improves, memory cells gradually become closer, with both
rows and columns within memory becoming denser; therefore, as the area of memory
cells reduce, disturbance issues can appear within DRAM, hindering novel ideas such
as Deep Learning (DL) and Artificial Intelligence (AI), which utilize large data sets
to understand applications such as automotive, mobile edge devices, medical imag-
ing applications, and enterprise storage. Some of these disturbance errors can be
associated with DRAM parasitic capacitance as well as Row Hammer attacks. Par-
asitic capacitance can occur due to effects of bit line coupling as the signal between
adjacent interconnect values vary. If two adjacent interconnects switch in the same
direction, no coupling capacitance would occur, however, if one or both neighboring
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of throughput of various CNN algorithms with and without
pipelined RH-encoding scheme
interconnects vary in opposite directions, coupling capacitance is introduced, creating
additional noise and disturbance errors [37]. Equation 1 below shows the RH induced
noise voltage swing, VRH , generated from N number of row hammers both above
and below the victim cell, induced due to the coupling capacitance, Cc between the
memory cells. The DRAM cell capacitance and power supply voltage are denoted by





Row hammer attacks can occur due to continuous pre-charge and activation of
rows of memory, effectively moving charge between rows of memory via coupling
capacitance between cells from adjacent rows. This causes bit flips to occur in memory
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without directly accessing the victim rows. The ratio of DRAM cell-to-cell coupling
capacitance, defined here as β, versus the potential number of row hammerings, N,
occurring in a DRAM cell is derived via (1) as shown in (2). We considered the noise





Using (2), the variation of N as a function of β is shown in Figure 4.11.
Figure 4.11: DRAM Coupling Capacitance vs. Number of Row Hammer Attacks
Figure 4.11 shows that a very low β value, typically less than 0.01, the number of
row hammerings vary significantly. however, after the parameter surpasses 0.01, the
number of row hammerings becomes constant. As there is more coupling capacitance
introduced signified by increasing in beta, memory cells are subjected more to the
parasitic effects of coupling capacitance such as adjacent aggressor rows switching
in opposite directions or remaining quiet. On the contrary, with very little coupling
capacitance as signified by a decreasing beta, a higher number of row hammering
attacks are necessary to inject the same 10% noise.
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Conclusion and Future Work
As the technology node advances, the gap between computational and memory per-
formance widens, causing a major performance bottleneck in contemporary comput-
ing devices. As computational power improves at a consistent rate, memory lags
behind, creating a ’memory-wall’ bottleneck. In traditional von Neumann Archi-
tectures, both the computing and storage unit are separated via interconnects over
which data travel for either computation or storage. Both power-consumption and
data-transfer bandwidth are impeded due to the physical separation of the processor
and memory component and constant data-transfer over interconnects, preventing a
processing device from reaching its peak performance.
Processing-in-Memory is a non-von Neumann computing model that aims to al-
leviate the performance bottleneck faced by traditional computing devices for data-
centric applications. The traditional computing devices are based on the von-Neumann
computing model that draws a distinct separation between the processor and the
memory and imposes a sequential or pipe-lined execution model. However, the off-
chip data communications between the memory and the processor are associated with
high latency, high power consumption, and a limited bandwidth. PIM offers a so-
lution to this phenomenon by locating the processing elements inside the memory
chip itself. The benefit of this is that the data-communication latency and energy
consumption are virtually eliminated as the data is processed within the same chip.
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Moreover, implementation of massively parallel processing within the memory chip is
possible by leveraging its ultra-high internal data-movement bandwidth.
The programmable PIM architecture delivers provides high-performance along
with the use of programmable LUT-based multiplexers in accomplishing a plethora
of applications. In comparison to contemporary PIM architectures, the pPIM archi-
tecture achieves better performance while consuming less power. Due to the superior
performance and power efficiency of the pPIM compared to the other architectures,
we choose the pPIM as a case study to evaluate the effect of RH-encoding.
The past few decades were marked by the rapid downscaling of semiconductor
technologies. This has resulted in a steady growth of the number of transistors and
therefore the processing capabilities of the computing devices. The memory devices
such as the DRAM have also undergone a similar downscaling trend, packing more
storage capacity with lower power consumption, at lower manufacturing costs . How-
ever, the downscaling of the technology has also lead to unique reliability issues in
the DRAM. Capacitive interaction between neighboring cells in the DRAM memory
chips on 35nm or lower technology nodes can lead to data corruption. Termed as
‘Row-Hammering ’, it was shown that severe data corruption and manipulation can
be pulled off by cleverly manipulating this phenomenon in the off-the-shelf commod-
ity DRAM chips. The security concern arising from the possibility of row-hammering
attacks becomes even more critical for the emerging Processing in Memory (PIM)
computing paradigm.
The security and reliability concerns arising from the discovery of Row-Hammering
on the DRAM technology affect all PIM architectures implemented on this memory
platform. A few approaches to prevent row-hammering attacks have already been pro-
posed, mostly dominated by the usage of counters and a probabilistic approach. These
approaches include Counter-based Activation (CBA), Counter-based Tree (CBT), row
remapping, probabilistic adjacent row activation (PARA), and Time Window Counter
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(TWiCe). However, common to all these approaches is the involvement of complex
and bulky intelligent logic circuitry to monitor and actively prevent row-hammering
corruption.
A method is proposed for preventing the row-hammering attacks on the DRAM
memory by performing RH-encoding of the data. We leverage a recent programmable
PIM architecture called pPIM for implementing the RH-encoding/decoding scheme
with low latency and ultra-high efficiency. The pPIM architecture features clusters of
programmable LUTs that work together to perform virtually any logic or arithmetic
operations. We also evaluate the latency, energy efficiency, and area overhead to
the baseline pPIM architecture caused by the implementation of our proposed row-
hammering preventing coding scheme and benchmark its performance with other
latest PIM architectures. We achieve a reduction in the number of vulnerable bits for
a majority of the bits at the cost of throughput and power consumption. We achieve
a reduction in the number of vulnerable bits for a majority of the bits at the cost of
throughput and power consumption.
5.1 Future Work
The presented work delivers synthesized models for a PIM architecture and the RH-
encoding scheme. In the future, improvements on the DRAM architecture should be
made to minimize the effects of the novel Row Hammer security bug as the technology
node improves alongside finding alternative solutions to counter RH attacks. As the
technology node improves, DRAM architecture will become denser and smaller. Rows
and columns inside the memory architecture may cause higher amounts of induction
and capacitance. In addition, new issues other than row hammer may appear as the
technology node improves. Therefore, an investigation into DRAM design is necessary
to combat and secure against vulnerabilities.
Further steps are needed to minimize the vulnerability of weights in all bit po-
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sitions of weights from the row hammer attack. An investigation into the encoding
scheme is necessary to combat the row hammer attack further. These steps involve
the development of multiple encoding schemes operating on different sections or por-
tions of the weights in neural networks. The usage of multiple encoding schemes
on different portions of the weights would reduce the number of vulnerable weights
in a CNN. However, multiple encoding schemes may require more multiple opera-
tion mapping configurations of the pPIM architecture. This may incur higher power
consumption and latency issues but aid in securing all of the weights in a network.
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